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Corporate Law
Does Trados Matter?
Abraham J.B. Cable1
Introduction
In 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion that
reverberated loudly in Silicon Valley. In the case of In re Trados
Inc. Shareholder Litigation,2 the court scrutinized the action of a
board of directors controlled by venture capital investors.
Specifically, the court considered the board’s decision to sell
Trados Incorporated for an amount that, in accordance with
customary Silicon Valley stock terms, resulted in payouts to
venture-capital (VC) funds holding preferred stock but no payouts
to common shareholders. After a lengthy trial, the court ultimately
found that the transaction was fair to the common shareholders
because of the company’s limited prospects.3 Yet the case was
notable for the court’s sharp critique of the board for failing to
more vigilantly serve common shareholders.4
The case inspired a wave of law-firm memos and client alerts
speculating about effects on VC financing terms.5 Leading law
firms, acting through the National Venture Capital Association,
developed elaborate forms of contracts to circumvent the case’s
effects.6 Legal scholars also took note of the case.7 In particular,
1

Excerpted and adapted from Abraham J.B. Cable, Does Trados
Matter?, 45 J. CORP. L. 311 (2020).
2
73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
3
Id. at 78.
4
Id. at 45.
5
E.g., Venture Capital Investing: Can the Liquidation Preference of
Preferred Stock Over the Common Stock Be Protected Where the
Common Stock Receives Little or Nothing in an Exit?, LATHAM &
WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT (Oct. 21, 2010).
6
See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, NVCA MODEL VOTING
AGREEMENT n.53 (2018).
7
E.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means
to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 290–95 (2015) (criticizing the
court’s reasoning for failing to recognize the board as a venue for
bargaining over the company’s future); Elizabeth Pollman, Startup
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they scrutinized language in the opinion adopting a rule of
“common maximization.” Under this controversial approach to
conflicts between common and preferred shareholders, a board
has a paramount duty to pursue value for the common holders
even when preferred holders have negotiated for control of the
board.8
But how much does Trados matter in influencing how boards
and their advisors think and act? I examined the question through
original interviews with 20 lawyers who guide startups and
investors through financing and exit transactions. Because these
transactional lawyers are a primary conduit of corporate law,
Trados, in a practical sense, means what these lawyers think it
means. Based on the interviews, I offer five primary observations.
Venture Capital Deal Terms
Trados has not meaningfully affected the terms of venturecapital investments. Technically, contractual mechanisms can
evade Trados. One mechanism is a “drag-along right” that allows
one set of shareholders to cause other shareholders to agree to a
merger or stock sale. Ordinarily, drag-along rights require board
approval of the triggering transaction. But one could avoid
entanglement with Trados by drafting a drag-along right that is
triggered solely by the preferred shareholders, without any board
Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 216–20 (2019) (discussing
Trados).
8
Trados, 73 A.3d at 40–41 (“[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board,
where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of
the common stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them
to be—to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc. . . .
of preferred stock.”). The primary conceptual alternative to common
maximization is enterprise maximization. See William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1815, 1885–86 (2013) (advocating for a rule that directors should
maximize aggregate enterprise value regardless of distributional
consequences to different classes of stockholders). Another alternative is
the “control-contingent” approach. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor,
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 967, 993 (2006) (advocating for a rule that would in some
circumstances allow a director to favor a class of stock that has
negotiated for board control).
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involvement, in order to force a stock sale by common
shareholders.
My interviewees reported, however, that drag-along
provisions are not usually modified in response to Trados because
such provisions are impractical to enforce. One interviewee stated
that most lawyers are “nervous about enforcement” of drag-along
rights in general because shareholders can make procedural
objections. Another suggested that any discussion of using dragalong provisions in response to Trados was just “optics” and has
not had any lasting effect. Yet another observed that it is “virtually
impossible” to buy a company without the support of the
founders.9
Board Process
Trados has modestly improved board process at the time a
company is sold. Responding to one of the court’s chief criticisms
of the Trados board,10 directors now more carefully document
whether common stock has any probable value given the
company’s chances of a turnaround. One interviewee reported that
Trados gave rise to “a notion” that the board has to “take into
account what benefits the common shareholders.” Another stated
that Trados results in “focus on process” and “build[ing] a record”
that the company “is running out of money” and “went out for
deals.” This documentation focuses on qualitative indications of
company distress rather than formal valuations by advisors.11
Allocations to Common
At the margins, Trados may motivate allocations to common
shareholders beyond their baseline entitlements. When a board
determines that common shares arguably have value, preferred
holders may insure against litigation by shifting some proceeds to
common shareholders.12
9

Cable, supra note 1, at 327–29.
Trados, 73 A.3d at 62 (stating that the board members “did not
understand . . . their job” when they failed to specifically consider the
effects of the sale on common holders).
11
Cable, supra note 1, at 330–34.
12
Id. at 334–35.
10
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Corporate Law Ambiguities
Many aspects of Trados remain ambiguous to the “startup
lawyers” who are primarily responsible for counseling startups
through financings and exits. For example, there is no clear
consensus regarding the boundaries of Trados—i.e., what
precisely in the Trados fact pattern triggered enhanced scrutiny.
Interviewees also did not agree on the extent to which Trados
endorsed a theory of common maximization, or whether such an
approach to common-preferred conflicts is in fact correct as a
matter of Delaware fiduciary principles. For example, several
interviewees stated that a board owes duties to “all shareholders,”
but this formulation does not precisely align with common
maximization or any of its usual alternatives.13
Some of this ambiguity may stem from the novelty and
complexity of issues addressed by Trados. Corporate scholars
have debated common maximization and its alternatives for years.
It is also possible that startup lawyers have limited knowledge of
Trados and other nuances of Delaware corporate law. While
interviewees reported being familiar with the case, they also
revealed that they do not consider themselves to be specialists in
Delaware corporate law. They instead envision themselves as
“general” corporate lawyers who call on specialists, such as M&A
lawyers or Delaware counsel, as needed.14
Muted Responsiveness
Due to resource constraints and a relatively mild litigation
environment, startup boards may not be as responsive to judicial
caselaw as their public-company counterparts. While publiccompany boards may regularly use fairness opinions and
independent committees to insulate transactions from judicial
scrutiny, startup boards consider these trappings of publiccompany governance to be disproportionately expensive or
impractical. One interviewee, for example, described a
“disconnect” between the amount of process required for a
Delaware corporation and the amount available to most startups,
and another stated that many sale transactions are not large enough
13
14

Id. at 336–38.
Id. at 340–41.
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to justify “fund[ing]” a special committee.15 As the Delaware
judiciary continues it dialogue with Silicon Valley startups, it
should be aware that judicial influence can be muted in this
environment. Such an awareness might ultimately affect doctrine,
such as sharpening the boundaries of Trados and employing
standards grounded in the practicalities of customary practice
rather than comparisons to public-company governance.
*

*

*

Judges can benefit from knowing how responsive the business
community is to judicial pronouncements. In the case of Trados,
the court’s message got through loudly but not entirely clearly.

15

Id. at 339.
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